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CHEVRON AND SKIDMORE IN THE WORKPLACE:  
UNHAPPY TOGETHER 
James J. Brudney* 
INTRODUCTION 
In its approach to agency deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council,1 the U.S. Supreme Court often implicates the 
relationship between Chevron and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.2  When 
Chevron was decided, many judges and legal scholars anticipated that its 
crisp two-stage test promoting deference to agency statutory construction 
would occupy the field, jilting Skidmore and her older multifactor standard 
favoring a softer form of deference.3  Other scholars at the time saw a 
continuing role for Skidmore.4  And since United States v. Mead Corp.,5 the 
Court‘s members apart from Justice Scalia regard it as only right that when 
reviewing an agency‘s statutory interpretation, Chevron and Skidmore 
 
*  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  I thank Lawrence Baum and the 
participants in the Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking Forward Symposium, 
organized by the Fordham Law Review, for their comments and insights.  I am grateful to 
Todd Lantz, Amanda Shami, Andrew Weisfeld, and the Fordham Law School Library for 
excellent research assistance, and to Cynthia Lamberty-Cameron for fine secretarial support.  
Fordham Law School contributed generous financial assistance. 
 
 1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 3. See, e.g., Equal Emp‘t Opportunity Comm. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 
259–60 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Antonin 
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 
513, 521 (predicting broad application of Chevron and receding role for Skidmore-type 
factors); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 
297, 307–08 (1986) (D.C. Circuit judge describing Chevron as having cast serious doubt on 
the multifactor sliding scale approach to judicial deference established under Skidmore, and 
expressing approval for the new judicial philosophy); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Scope of 
Judicial Review of Issues of Law:  Chevron Revisited, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 277 (1992) (never 
mentioning Skidmore); E. Donald Elliott & Peter H. Schuck, To the Chevron Station:  An 
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1024 (describing 
Chevron as sweeping aside all other tests for determining deference to agency 
constructions). 
 4. See, e.g., Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes:  
An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 266 (1988); Michael Herz, Deference 
Running Riot:  Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 
187, 208–09 (1992); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 
101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992) (questioning the thesis that Chevron has supplanted earlier 
deference regimes). 
 5. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
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should be thought about together—if not ―day and night,‖6 then at least on a 
regular basis. 
This Article examines developments since Chevron in the Court‘s 
application of agency deference to its workplace law decisions.7  The 
Article relies on a dataset of 730 decisions compiled for the 1969 through 
2012 Terms, including 300 cases that predate Chevron.  Its empirical 
analysis focuses primarily on the Court‘s review of decisions by the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the Department of Labor (DOL).  
These three agencies have long been responsible for implementing statutes 
that occupy the major portion of the Court‘s workplace law docket.  
Moreover, each agency operated under some form of judicial deference 
regime well before 1984. 
The results of this empirical review are surprising in several respects.  
During the early Chevron era, conventional wisdom was that the decision 
would or should result in agency deference becoming a more influential 
factor in the judicial interpretation of statutory meaning.8  Based on thirty 
years of Supreme Court decisions in the workplace law area, however, this 
has not happened.  The Court‘s reliance on agency deference in comparison 
to other interpretive resources is no greater since 1984 than it was before 
Chevron.9 
With respect to the major agencies implementing workplace statutes, the 
Court‘s pre-Chevron approach to the NLRB arguably anticipated the broad 
deference accorded to interpretive judgments under Chevron.10  
Conversely, the Court‘s treatment of the EEOC prior to Chevron featured 
the more searching review conventionally associated with Skidmore.11  This 
distinction has persisted since 1984.12  Despite these primary associations—
 
 6. See THE TURTLES, HAPPY TOGETHER (White Whale 1967) (―Imagine me and you, I 
do:  I think about you day and night.  It‘s only right to think about the girl you love and hold 
her tight, so happy together.‖). 
 7. For an overview of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, 
Foreword:  Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 
(2014).  A number of other contributions to this symposium focus extensively on the 
interaction between Chevron, Mead, and Skidmore more generally. See Jack M. Beermann, 
Chevron at the Roberts Court:  Still Failing After All These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 
741–43 (2014); Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 
528–30 (2014); Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
753, 756–58 (2014); Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 
792–93 (2014). 
 8. See generally supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra Part I.A. 
 10. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500–01 (1978); NLRB v. J. 
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 261–62 (1975); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 
235–36 (1963); see also infra Part I.B (discussing deference to three main workplace law 
agencies). 
 11. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 69–71 (1982); Gen. Elec. Co. 
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140–45 (1976); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93–95 
(1973).  The Court‘s treatment of DOL interpretations prior to Chevron was more mixed:  
some agency judgments received broad deference while others warranted more searching 
review. See infra Part I.B. 
 12. See infra Part I.B. 
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the EEOC with Skidmore and the NLRB with Chevron—the Court‘s pro-
agency outcomes since 1984 have increased modestly for the EEOC 
(52 percent versus 43 percent before Chevron) and decreased sharply for 
the NLRB (52 percent versus 74 percent before Chevron).13  These findings 
are in tension with the hypothesis that Chevron is linked to a heightened 
respect for agency interpretive judgments. 
A final dimension of the Chevron-Skidmore relationship explored here 
involves the extent to which agency deference minimizes the role of 
ideological preferences in judicial review.  The conventional wisdom was 
that Chevron‘s call for heightened deference could lead both liberal and 
conservative wings of the Court to act in a more politically neutral fashion 
than had been perceived under Skidmore.  The Court‘s workplace law cases 
are an appropriate subset from which to examine this issue, given the 
fundamentally pro-employee nature of federal labor and employment 
statutes.14  It turns out that in contrast to the fifteen years prior to Chevron, 
agency win rates in the Chevron era are higher when the agency position 
favors employers than when the agency supports employees.15  While this 
result doubtless reflects in part the increasingly conservative composition of 
the Court since 1986, it raises questions about the predictions that Chevron 
would usher in an era of more ideologically neutral judicial deference. 
Two post-Chevron decisions reviewing agency interpretations of the term 
―supervisor‖ illustrate the extent to which discussion of formal deference 
regimes may obscure more than enlighten.  In NLRB v. Health Care & 
Retirement Corp. of America,16 the Board over twenty-five years had 
narrowly construed the National Labor Relations Act17 (NLRA) exemption 
for ―supervisors‖ in the health care setting so as to exclude from the scope 
of employee protection only nurses whose direction of other employees 
involved hiring, discipline, and similar personnel responsibilities, not the 
direction of those employees in the exercise of professional patient-care 
judgments.18  The Court by a five-to-four vote rejected the agency‘s 
construction and in doing so expanded considerably the Act‘s exemption 
for supervisors.19  In Vance v. Ball State University,20 the EEOC over 
fourteen years had construed ―supervisor‖ broadly in its Guidance covering 
harassment by supervisors as ―agents‖ of the employer, to include 
 
 13. For more detailed discussion, see infra Part I.B. 
 14. Congress‘s broad legislative goals in this field have been to promote employee rights 
and protections.  In addition, the basic dichotomy between employer and employee/union 
positions makes it relatively straightforward to identify and code Supreme Court results.  
Thus, it is easier to assess whether agency deference is associated with liberal (or 
conservative) outcomes in workplace law than for other subject areas that feature multiple 
disparate constituencies, such as securities law or communications law. See James J. 
Brudney, Isolated and Politicized:  The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL‘Y J. 221, 257–58 (2005). 
 15. See infra Part I.C. 
 16. 511 U.S. 571 (1994). 
 17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
 18. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 574. 
 19. Id. at 584. 
 20. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
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employees who help direct the daily work activities of other employees 
even if they have no authority to make personnel decisions.21  The Court, 
again by a five-to-four vote, rejected the agency construction and in doing 
so excluded from the scope of employer liability the same group of 
employees that the Justices had deemed to be supervisors under the NLRA. 
The majority in Health Care never refers to Chevron at all, while the 
dissent relies heavily on agency deference and invokes Chevron-type 
analysis throughout.  The majority in Vance dismisses Skidmore deference 
in a footnote, while the dissent emphasizes the persuasiveness of a 
Skidmore approach.  The Court‘s opaque treatment of its two principal 
deference-defining decisions is not unusual in the field of workplace law.22  
And although a pair of individual cases cannot be deemed adequately 
representative of the entire dataset, the Court‘s unwillingness to defer to an 
agency construction of inconclusive statutory text is also far from unusual 
where, as in these two decisions, the agency construction favors 
employees.23 
Part I of this Article examines the Court‘s workplace law decisions from 
an empirical standpoint, focusing on its review of interpretive judgments by 
the NLRB, the EEOC, and the DOL.  Certain key findings reflect the 
minimal or counter-suggestive impact of Chevron.  Part II analyzes two 
decisions, Health Care and Vance, from a doctrinal standpoint.  This part 
criticizes the Court‘s refusal to defer under either a Chevron or Skidmore 
framework given the agencies‘ well-settled treatment of the ―supervisor‖ 
concept, a concept that is central both to the NLRA definition of a covered 
―employee‖ and to employer responsibility and liability under 
antidiscrimination law.  Part III offers several possible explanations for 
outcomes such as Health Care, Vance, and the broader results presented in 
Part I.  One explanation is ideological:  any distinction between Chevron 
and Skidmore deference may be vitiated by the reality that the Justices‘ 
policy preferences trump administrative law principles.  A second 
explanation is methodological:  the impact of Chevron may be overstated 
because the Court has become so textually fixated that it focuses heavily on 
a searching Step One review, and Skidmore factors are often part of that 
review process.  A final explanation is institutional:  the Court‘s varied 
practical experience with deference for the NLRB and the EEOC may 
reflect the distinct nature of ongoing relations between those agencies and 
Congress. 
I.   EMPIRICAL FINDINGS:  NO NEW ERA OF DEFERENCE UNDER CHEVRON 
The dataset of Supreme Court decisions consists of more than 730 
workplace law cases decided over forty-four Terms:  all seventeen Terms of 
 
 21. Id. at 2449–50. 
 22. See infra note 27 and accompanying text (indicating that only one-third of opinions 
relying on agency deference invoke Chevron or Skidmore). 
 23. See infra Part I.C (indicating that Court win rate for workplace agencies is higher 
when agency interpretation is pro-employer than pro-employee). 
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the Burger Court, all nineteen Terms of the Rehnquist Court, and the first 
eight Terms of the Roberts Court.  The Court decided Chevron one-third of 
the way through this period but because the Court docket was heaviest 
during the Burger years, two-fifths of the total number of cases were 
decided before Chevron.  Cases are included in the dataset insofar as the 
dispute before the Court affects employees or employers in their status as 
employment-related actors.24  The decisions almost always feature 
employees and/or unions in connection with employers, but they 
occasionally involve the tax consequences or immigration effects of an 
employment-based event. 
In their comprehensive study of the Court‘s post-Chevron approaches to 
deference, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer concluded that the Court‘s 
deference regimes since 1984 have been more of a continuum than a 
dichotomy.25  They also found that, despite the attendant volume of judicial 
and scholarly dialogue, Chevron or Skidmore were applied in only 15 
percent of more than 1000 decisions in which an agency interpretation was 
at issue.26  Although this proportion is higher in my dataset, two-thirds of 
the workplace law decisions in which the majority or the dissent relied on 
agency deference do not refer either to Chevron or Skidmore.27  That said, 
other workplace law decisions often characterize deference standards in 
terms that are comparable to the expansive approach adopted in Chevron or 
the narrower standard set forth in Skidmore. 
 
 24. The criteria used to construct and maintain this workplace law dataset are fully 
described in James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive 
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15–29 (2005) and more briefly in James J. 
Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation:  Comparing 
Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1248–49 
(2009). 
 25. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1098 (2008). 
 26. Id. at 1089–90, 1098–99. 
 27. Of seventy-two decisions since 1984 in which the Court invoked agency deference 
to help justify the result, 28 percent (twenty of seventy-two) identify Chevron, Skidmore, or 
both.  Of the thirty-seven principal dissenting opinions that expressly rely on agency 
deference, 43 percent (sixteen of thirty-seven) refer to one or both of these leading decisions.  
It is worth noting that Eskridge and Baer adopted a broader standard to construct a universe 
of agency deference cases than is used for this dataset.  An agency interpretation is ―at issue‖ 
in my workplace law dataset if the Court‘s majority opinion or principal dissent discussed a 
publicly available agency interpretation as part of its ratio decidendi.  That universe includes 
the two reliance categories identified above plus any additional cases where the majority 
considers and declines to rely on deference to agency judgments.  Eskridge and Baer‘s 
dataset encompasses those cases of explicit reliance or rejection by the Justices, but also 
includes:  (a) all cases in which the United States filed a brief interpreting the statute, and 
(b) all cases in which a brief in the case revealed a publicly available agency interpretation 
on point. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 25, at 1090 n.33; see also id. at 1112 n.108 
(explaining that in 314 of their 1014 cases, the agency interpretation of the statute was 
presented only in the Solicitor General‘s amicus brief). 
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A.   Agency Deference in Relation to Other Interpretive Resources:  
Surprisingly Stable 
The field of workplace law is heavily populated by aging statutes.  Most 
major laws are forty years old (Employee Security Income Retirement Act), 
fifty years old (Title VII), sixty-five years old (Labor Management 
Relations Act), even seventy-five or eighty years old (Fair Labor Standards 
Act, National Labor Relations Act).  Although some of these laws have 
been amended since the late 1970s, there have been relatively few 
modifications in the past two decades.28 
One might reasonably infer that when a workplace statute has been in 
place for several decades, the Supreme Court will have addressed most 
first-order controversies about the meaning of key statutory provisions that 
protect, permit, or prohibit specific employee or employer conduct.29  
Accordingly, for second and third generation controversies, the Court might 
look less often to original legislative intent or purpose—arguably reflected 
in what the enacting Congress communicated through legislative history—
and more often to intervening levels of authority, especially the Court‘s 
own precedent and also agency interpretations developed during the 
implementation process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28. Congress‘s rate of enacting statutes has declined in general since the arrival of 
Republican control in the House starting in 1995. See Historical Statistics About Legislation 
in the U.S. Congress, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2014) (showing a sharp decline from an average of 667 enacted statutes in 
the period 1975 through 1994 (94th through 103d Congress), to an average of 397 enacted 
statutes from 1995 through 2014 (104th through 113th Congress)).  The pace for workplace 
statutes is slower than for many other fields, such as securities law, telecommunications law, 
or consumer protection law.  For example, in the last twenty years, Congress has enacted two 
workplace statutes (2008 American with Disabilities Act (ADA) Amendments and 2009 Lily 
Ledbetter Act), compared with its enactment of eleven securities law statutes, twelve 
telecommunications statutes, and six consumer protection statutes. See CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://beta.congress.gov/advanced-search (full advanced search strategy on file with 
Fordham Law Review). 
 29. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and McDonald v. Santa 
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (each addressing meaning of ―discrimination‖ 
under Title VII); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) and Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. 
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (each addressing meaning of ―bargain in good faith‖ under 
NLRA); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947) and Rutherford Food Corp. 
v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (each addressing meaning of ―employees‖ and 
―employment‖ under FLSA). 
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Table 1:  Reliance on Interpretive Resources 
1969–2013 
   Resource 
Percentage of 350 
Burger Court 
Cases  
Percentage of 299 
Rehnquist Court 
Cases 
Percentage of 82 
Roberts Court 
Cases  
Textual Meaning  49.1  62.5  65.9  
Dictionary    1.4    6.0  14.6  
Language Canons  12.0  24.4  28.0  
Legislative History  46.6  28.1  20.7  
Legislative Purpose  86.9  72.9  54.9  
Legislative Inaction    5.7    6.0    4.9  
Sup. Court Precedent  80.3  86.0  96.3  
Common Law Precedent    9.4  15.4  20.7  
Substantive Canons    8.3  15.4  19.5  
   Agency Deference 17.1 17.4 15.9 
 
The data reported in Table 1 are consistent with this hypothesis in certain 
respects.  They disclose a marked decline in Supreme Court reliance on 
both legislative history and legislative purpose, as well as a notable increase 
in reliance on Supreme Court precedent.  There is, however, no change in 
the level of reliance on agency deference from the Burger Court through the 
Rehnquist Court and the first eight Terms of the Roberts Court.  Instead, 
there has been a continuous and substantial increase in the Court‘s reliance 
on more judicially grounded assets:  canons, dictionaries, and common law 
precedent as well as previously noted Supreme Court precedent. 
The stability of the Court‘s approach to agency deference in relation to 
other interpretive resources is surprising given early predictions 
accompanying the Chevron standard30 and also the maturity of workplace 
statutes.  One might have anticipated that because Congress revisits most of 
these laws only infrequently, and the NLRB, EEOC, and DOL have become 
primary sources of politically accountable authority for statutory 
implementation, the Court would be more willing to defer to agency 
interpretations of aging statutory texts.  On the other hand, perhaps the 
Court‘s apparent lack of interest in deferring more often to agency rules or 
guidance is related to its strikingly increased reliance on textual assets like 
the dictionary and language canons.  Those interpretive resources suggest 
that the Court is more inclined toward de novo style review of agency 
 
 30. See generally Scalia, supra note 3; Sargentich, supra note 3. 
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interpretations—whether framed as stage one Chevron analysis31 or simply 
as a close reading of the contested text. 
B.   Deference to Key Workplace Law Agencies:  Unexpected Changes 
Three federal agencies are responsible for implementing the major 
federal workplace statutes.  The NLRB administers and litigates issues 
related to a single labor relations statute.  The EEOC is responsible for 
providing guidance and litigation assistance on three major civil rights 
statutes.32  The DOL oversees implementation of a wide range of labor 
standards statutes.33  From 1984 to 2013, two-thirds of the Court‘s 
workplace law decisions implicating agency deference involved these three 
agencies.34 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court prior to Chevron had articulated a 
generous approach to deference for NLRB adjudications.35  With respect to 
questions of fact, the Court in 1951 construed the NLRA‘s ―substantial 
evidence on the record considered as a whole‖36 standard to include a 
recognition that the Board is ―one of those agencies presumably equipped 
or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge 
[labor-management relations], whose findings within that field carry the 
authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must 
respect.‖37 
 
 31. See Scalia, supra note 3, at 521 (―One who finds more often (as I do) that the 
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, 
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for [Step Two] Chevron deference 
exists.‖). 
 32. Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012); Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 33. These statutes include the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 
(2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 
(2012); Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012); Mine 
Safety and Health Act (MSHA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–965 (2012); Longshore and Harbor 
Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2012); Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109 (2012); and Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012). 
 34. Of the 119 decisions in which the majority expressly relied on or rejected agency 
deference during this period, DOL was the relevant agency in thirty cases, EEOC in twenty-
seven, and NLRB in twenty-one.  The remaining decisions involved thirteen different 
agencies, only one of which (IRS) was involved in as many as four decisions. 
 35. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).  Congress added the ―substantial evidence‖ standard in 1947 to 
modify the original Wagner Act standard that Board findings ―if supported by evidence, 
shall be conclusive.‖  The change parallels Congress‘s enactment of the ―substantial 
evidence‖ standard as part of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) 
(2012). 
 37. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).  Given the passage of 
time and the range of factual settings presented by individual cases, the courts of appeals 
have not applied this standard in a uniform way.  Still, the Universal Camera standard has 
supported an ongoing appellate court commitment to substantial deference on Board factual 
findings, including but not limited to findings that turn on credibility determinations. See, 
e.g., NLRB v. Horizons Hotel Corp., 49 F.3d 795, 799 (1st Cir. 1995); J. Huizinga Cartage 
2014] CHEVRON AND SKIDMORE IN THE WORKPLACE 505 
With respect to questions of law, the Court in 1978 made clear that the 
Board is entitled to special deference when interpreting provisions of the 
NLRA.  In Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB,38 the Court emphasized the 
limited nature of judicial review on such questions: 
 It is the Board on which Congress conferred the authority to develop 
and apply fundamental national labor policy. [Therefore the Board] 
necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of 
the broad statutory provisions. . . .  The function of striking th[e] balance 
[between conflicting legitimate interests] to effectuate national labor 
policy is [a] . . . responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily 
to the [NLRB] . . . .  The judicial role is narrow:  The rule which the 
Board adopts is judicially reviewable for consistency with the Act, and for 
rationality.39 
This approach to agency deference on matters of statutory interpretation 
is consonant with, and arguably anticipates, the second stage of Chevron 
review announced six Terms later. 
The Court‘s pre-Chevron stance on deference to EEOC interpretations of 
Title VII40 was more constrained than its position toward the NLRB.  As 
explained by the Court, Congress in Title VII did not confer upon the 
EEOC authority to promulgate substantive rules.41  Accordingly, agency 
guidelines construing statutory meaning or legislative intent were not 
entitled to the same weight as rules that Congress had declared to carry the 
force of law.  Instead, EEOC interpretations were best characterized as 
informal agency views, entitled to Skidmore-level deference.42 
The Court‘s pre-Chevron approach to DOL interpretations was 
something of a hybrid.  Most statutes give the DOL considerable 
interpretive scope through grants of authority to issue regulations,43 and the 
 
Co. v. NLRB, 941 F.2d 616, 619, 620–21 (7th Cir. 1991); Pergament United Sales, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 920 F.2d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 38. 437 U.S. 483 (1978). 
 39. Id. at 500–01 (citing to NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 235–36 (1963) 
and Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941)).  The Court‘s reference to 
Board ―rules‖ encompasses standards adopted through adjudication.  As of 1978, the Board 
had never engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking, and the Court several years before 
Beth Israel held that the Board may announce new doctrinal standards through adjudication 
as well as rulemaking. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974). 
 40. Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). 
 41. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).  The Gilbert Court noted that § 713(a) gives the EEOC 
―authority from time to time to issue . . . suitable procedural regulations to carry out the 
provisions of this subchapter,‖ but it concluded that this section does not confer authority to 
interpret substantive statutory meaning. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141 n.20. 
 42. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141–43. See EEOC v. Assoc. Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 
600 n.17 (1981); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 n.4 (1977); Trans World 
Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76 n.11 (1977). But cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971) (observing that ―[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by 
the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference,‖ citing earlier non-Title VII decisions). 
 43. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (2012) (authorizing promulgation of occupational 
safety or health standards); id. §§ 1029, 1135 (authorizing promulgation of regulations 
related to employee retirement plans); id. § 438 (authorizing promulgation of regulations 
related to union reporting and disclosure requirements). 
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Court at times deferred to agency judgments undertaken pursuant to that 
congressional authority.44  On the other hand, the DOL also interprets its 
authorizing laws by using less formal mechanisms such as guidelines, 
individual case determinations, or advisory opinions, and these 
interpretations on occasion received less deferential judicial review prior to 
1984.45 
The varying pre-Chevron approaches to deference for these three major 
workplace law agencies have essentially been carried forward under 
Chevron.  Based on Step Zero analysis, agency legal positions qualify for 
Chevron deference if adopted pursuant to rule of law authority that has been 
delegated to the agency by Congress.46  Although Congress has conferred 
that force of law authority for NLRB interpretations adopted through 
rulemaking, it has not done so in formal terms for agency interpretations 
promulgated through adjudication.47  Yet the Court has expressly invoked 
Chevron when reviewing NLRB adjudications on a number of occasions,48 
and in general its level of deference to Board interpretations reflects a 
Chevron framework rather than a Skidmore approach.49  The Court has 
frequently invoked Chevron when explaining the deference it is prepared to 
accord to an NLRB adjudication.  The Court‘s deference discussion has 
featured Chevron when it has affirmed Board adjudications under a Step 
Two review50 and also when it has rejected Board adjudicatory positions 
based on a more rigorous Step One–type analysis.51  Moreover, when 
 
 44. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1980) (deferring to 
Secretary‘s interpretation under Occupational Safety and Health Act); Local 3489, United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 313 (1977) (deferring to Secretary‘s 
interpretation under Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act). 
 45. See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers‘ Comp. Programs, 449 U.S. 
268, 273–80 (1980) (relying on text and legislative history, and refusing to defer to series of 
caselaw determinations by Benefits Review Board). 
 46. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001). See generally Thomas 
W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 (2001). 
 47. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 46, at 892. 
 48. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713–14 (2001); Holly 
Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398–99, 408–09 (1996); ABF Freight Sys. v. NLRB, 
510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994). 
 49. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 
123–24 (1987) (reviewing validity of promulgated regulation under Chevron Step Two, and 
equating this test to traditional deference accorded to Board regarding agency interpretations 
that are ―rational and consistent with the [Act]‖); Jonathan D. Hacker, Note, Are Trojan 
Horse Union Organizers ―Employees‖?:  A New Look at Deference to the NLRB’s 
Interpretation of NLRA Section 2(3), 93 MICH. L. REV. 772, 775–76, 788–89 (1995) 
(equating Chevron deference with traditional Board deference—broader than Skidmore). 
 50. See Ky. River Cmty. Care Inc., 532 U.S. at 713; Holly Farms Corp, 517 U.S. at 398–
99, 408–409; ABF Freight Sys., 510 U.S. at 324. 
 51. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148–49 (2002) 
(declining to defer because of conflict between Board legal position and policies of another 
federal law that Board lacks authority to enforce or administer); id. at 161 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Board‘s interpretation is reasonable hence warrants deference under 
Chevron Step Two); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539 (1992) (rejecting agency 
position as based on ―erroneous legal foundations‖ with respect to scope and meaning of § 7 
(citation omitted)); id. at 545 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Board‘s interpretations 
warrant deference under Chevron Step Two). 
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relying on Chevron to support a Board regulation, the Court has made clear 
that the Chevron Step Two standard—whether the interpretation is based on 
a permissible construction of the text—is equivalent to the Court‘s pre-
Chevron deference when reviewing Board adjudicatory interpretations of 
the Act.52 
Congress has given the EEOC rule of law authority for the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) but not for Title VII, which has been the primary 
implementation focus for the Court when reviewing agency 
interpretations.53  As a result, the Court has at times applied Chevron when 
reviewing EEOC interpretive judgments outside of Title VII.54  More often, 
however, the Justices have invoked a Skidmore framework when reviewing 
EEOC determinations.55  Indeed, since 1984, the Court has never relied on 
Chevron when reviewing EEOC interpretations of Title VII text.  The 
majority has opined on a number of occasions that agency interpretations of 
Title VII are entitled only to Skidmore deference,56 and its refusal to invoke 
Chevron occasionally has been criticized in a separate opinion.57  While the 
 
 52. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S. at 123–24 
(citing to Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987); Ford 
Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495, 497 (1979); and Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 
U.S. 483, 501 (1978)).  Overall, the Court has expressly relied on Chevron in majority or 
dissent in seven of twenty-one post-Chevron decisions reviewing NLRB:  five majority and 
two dissent.  The Justices have not invoked Skidmore at all when reviewing NLRB 
decisions. 
 53. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2012) (conferring rulemaking authority under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act), and 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2012) (conferring rulemaking 
authority under Americans with Disabilities Act), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (reciting 
EEOC powers under Title VII which do not include rule of law authority).  Supreme Court 
decisions involving the EEOC primarily address Title VII as opposed to the ADEA or ADA:  
this is true for 93 percent of decisions prior to 1984 and 48 percent since 1984. 
 54. See, e.g., General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2003) 
(applying Chevron framework to agency interpretation of ADEA); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 84 (2002) (applying Chevron framework to agency interpretation of 
ADA). 
 55. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256–57 (1991) (applying 
Skidmore framework to agency interpretation of Title VII); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. 
Ct. 2434, 2443 n.4 (2013) (same); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 
2533 (2013) (same); Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135, 150 (2008) (applying Skidmore 
framework to agency interpretation of ADEA).  Overall, the Court has expressly relied on 
Skidmore in majority or dissent in nine of twenty-seven post-Chevron decisions reviewing 
the EEOC:  four majority and five dissent.  The Court has relied on Chevron when reviewing 
three EEOC decisions—two construing the ADEA and one under the ADA. 
 56. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); Int‘l Ass‘n of 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 517–18 (1986); Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. 
at 256–57; Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 642 n.11 (2007) 
(declining to extend Chevron deference); see also Kasten v. Saint-Gobin Performance 
Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335 (2011) (according Skidmore deference to EEOC 
guidelines under Equal Pay Act); Clackemas Gastroenterology Assoc. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 
440, 448–49 (2003) (according Skidmore deference to EEOC guidelines under the ADA). 
 57. See EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 125 (1988) (O‘Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 259–60 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Gen. Dynamics v. 
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 605–06 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding there is no need to 
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Court has invoked Chevron when considering the scope of deference to 
EEOC interpretations of the ADEA and ADA, it has not been entirely 
consistent on this score.58  In any event, the Agency‘s Title VII 
interpretations have been the primary focus of EEOC decisions reviewed by 
the Court since Chevron.59 
The Court‘s post-Chevron approach to the DOL continues to reflect a 
hybrid approach.  The Justices often apply the Chevron test, especially for 
statutes where the agency‘s interpretation is conveyed through some form 
of regulation.60  But there are also a certain number of Skidmore-type 
analyses, usually when the DOL interpretation is not as formal, such as an 
advisory opinion, a party or amicus brief, or an interpretive bulletin, rather 
than a regulation.61 
Against this backdrop, one might expect that the Court‘s willingness to 
defer to the NLRB and DOL would increase given its professed 
commitment to applying a Chevron-type analysis.  By contrast the Court‘s 
record on deference to the EEOC might be expected to remain basically 
unchanged in light of its continuation of a Skidmore-type approach. 
Yet as Table 2 indicates, the results differ markedly from those 
expectations.  When invoking agency deference as a probative resource, the 
Court is less likely to support agency interpretations since Chevron than it 
was in the prior fifteen years—even though the earlier period is thought to 
be characterized by more rigorous judicial review of agency interpretive 
 
decide if Chevron applies to ADEA regulation because the EEOC is correct under Step One 
and surely reasonable under Step Two). 
 58. Compare, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 84 (2002) (applying 
Chevron deference to an EEOC regulation interpreting ADA text), and Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. 
of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 170–71 (1989) (applying Chevron Step One to reject 
deference under ADEA), and Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (applying Chevron deference to an EEOC 
regulation interpreting ADEA although majority does not rely on or mention Chevron), with 
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (according Skidmore deference 
to consistent EEOC interpretations of ADEA provision), and Clackemas, 538 U.S. at 448–51 
(according Skidmore deference to EEOC interpretation of ADA provision).  Some of the 
tensions involving the ADEA and the ADA may be explained by reference to the Step Zero 
rule of law distinction under Mead, but not all of them. See, e.g., Smith, 544 U.S. 228. 
 59. Of twenty-seven post-Chevron decisions in which the Court reviewed an EEOC 
interpretation and expressly invoked agency deference, thirteen involved Title VII, seven 
involved the ADA, and seven involved the ADEA.  Of fourteen pre-Chevron decisions in 
which the Court examined agency deference to EEOC interpretations, all but one involved 
Title VII. 
 60. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173–74 (2007) 
(FLSA); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–700 (1991) (Black Lung Act); 
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116–17 (1989) (ERISA); see also Pittston Coal Grp. 
v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113–17 (1988) (Black Lung Act; agency interpretation rejected at 
Chevron Step One). 
 61. See, e.g., Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1335–36 (2011) (amicus brief interpreting FLSA 
text); Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2004) (advisory opinion construing ERISA 
provision); Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 136 (1997) (party brief 
interpreting LHWCA); see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) 
(denying Skidmore deference to agency opinion letter construing FLSA); John Hancock Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 106–09 (1993) (denying Skidmore 
and Chevron deference to agency interpretive bulletin interpreting ERISA). 
2014] CHEVRON AND SKIDMORE IN THE WORKPLACE 509 
positions.  The Court‘s record of relying on deference to the EEOC 
increased slightly in the post-Chevron period.  This difference is modest, 
however, and is consistent with the Court reviewing a higher proportion of 
EEOC interpretations involving the ADEA and ADA, statutes in which 
Congress conferred rule of law interpretive authority on the agency.62 
 
Table 2:  Deference to Three Primary Workplace Law Agencies 
 
Pre-Chevron Post-Chevron 
Agency Support Agency Rejection Agency Support Agency Rejection 
EEOC 43%  (6/14) 57%  (8/14) 52%  (14/27) 48%  (13/27) 
NLRB 74%  (29/39) 26%  (10/39) 52%  (11/21) 48%  (10/21) 
DOL 83%  (5/6) 17%  (1/6) 67%  (20/30) 33%  (10/30) 
Overall 68% (40/59) 32%  (19/59) 58%  (45/78) 42%  (33/78) 
 
Of greater interest is the Court‘s declining record of support for 
interpretations rendered by the NLRB and DOL—the two agencies 
associated with Chevron-level deference.  The Court has been clear that 
NLRB adjudications and rules receive Chevron-style review, and yet the 
Court has been notably more willing to reject deference to the Board‘s 
interpretive judgments since Chevron.  With respect to the DOL, the pre-
Chevron numbers are small but the Court since Chevron has often declined 
to follow DOL interpretations.  In doing so, the Court has invoked Chevron 
Step One analysis on some occasions and Skidmore lack of persuasive 
power on others.63  Still, the Court‘s rejection of agency interpretations by 
the DOL and NLRB has most often cited to neither Chevron nor Skidmore 
but rather to the basic inadequacy of the agency‘s legal position.64 
 
 62. See supra note 53 (providing data on Court‘s review of decisions involving EEOC); 
supra note 58 (citing opinions applying Chevron deference under ADA and ADEA).  Still, 
there are not many such cases, and occasionally the EEOC is rejected under Chevron. See 
Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989) (rejecting agency 
interpretation of ADEA at Step One). 
 63. For Chevron Step One rejections, see, for example, Pittston Coal Group, 488 U.S. at 
113–17; Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86–96 (2002).  For Skidmore 
rejections, see, for example, Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; John Hancock, 510 U.S. at 106–
09. 
 64. For NLRB interpretations not deferred to, see, for example, New Process Steel L.P. 
v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct 2635 (2010); NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571 
(1994); Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).  For DOL interpretations 
rejected, see, for example, Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596 (2012); Director, Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994). 
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A possible factor contributing to a post-Chevron decline in the Court‘s 
willingness to defer is an increase in dissonance between the political 
orientation of agencies and the Court since 1984.  The Court‘s membership 
has grown steadily more conservative starting in 1969.65  But while the 
presidency was occupied primarily by Republicans from 1969 to 1984, it 
has been more evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans since 
1984.66  One way to examine the possible influence of Supreme Court 
partisanship in the Chevron era is to consider agency win rates before the 
Court when an agency favors employees versus when it supports 
employers. 
C.   Agency Deference and the Court’s Ideological Preferences:   
Favoring Employers 
In the wake of Chevron, some scholars anticipated that the new form of 
deference based on respect for politically accountable agencies would likely 
diminish the result-oriented nature of judicial review applied to agency 
interpretations.67  Recently, however, empirical work suggests that in the 
Chevron era, conservative Justices are more likely to validate conservative 
agency interpretations than liberal ones, and liberal Justices are similarly 
likely to agree with liberal agency interpretations more often than 
conservative ones.68  In addition, Margaret Lemos in her study of Supreme 
Court and agency interpretations of Title VII reported that the EEOC is 
notably more liberal (i.e., pro-employee) than the Supreme Court when both 
institutions address the same Title VII issues:  EEOC interpretations have 
been liberal more than 90 percent of the time while Court positions have 
been liberal in 64 percent of the cases.69  My own previous work on the 
NLRB and the Court is broadly consistent with Lemos‘s findings.  The 
 
 65. From 1969 to 1984, all six new appointments to the Court were made by Republican 
presidents.  Since 1984, five of the nine new appointments have been made by Republican 
presidents.  Moreover, both Republican and Democrat appointees are viewed as more 
conservative than predecessors of the same partisan persuasion. See Nate Silver, Supreme 
Court May Be Most Conservative in Modern History, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 29, 2012, 
8:06 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/supreme-court-may-be-most-
conservative-in-modern-history/. See generally Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee 
Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 
1300–04 (2005). 
 66. From 1969 to 1984, Republican Presidents occupied the White House for twelve of 
sixteen years.  Since 1984, Republicans have been President for sixteen years (1985 to 1992 
and 2001 to 2008) and Democrats for fourteen years (1993 to 2000 and 2009 to 2014).  
Assuming the Court‘s docket through June 2013 would likely include agency rulings only 
through June 2011, that is still a ratio of sixteen to eleven. 
 67. See generally Scalia, supra note 3; Starr, supra note 3; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and 
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990). 
 68. See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron As A Canon, Not A 
Precedent:  An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1786–89 (2010); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges 
Make Regulatory Policy?  An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 
831–47 (2006); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 25, at 1155. 
 69. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate:  
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 389–90 (2010). 
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Board‘s determinations that employers violated employee rights (a liberal 
agency determination) under the core statutory provision prohibiting 
employer coercion or discrimination have been sustained 57 percent of the 
time since 1970.70  This agency success record is substantially lower than 
the 83 percent affirmance rate the NLRB enjoyed for violations under the 
same core provision from 1940 through 1969.71 
Although the politicized valence accompanying Supreme Court review of 
agency rulings is not a huge surprise, an account based only on judicial 
ideology is likely to omit relevant institutional considerations.  The 
divergence between the Supreme Court and the EEOC or NLRB on 
disputes concerning employer liability is doubtless due in part to the Court 
becoming increasingly conservative since 1970.  At the same time, the 
divergence also may be attributable to a degree of mission conflict between 
the Court and these workplace agencies.  The EEOC and NLRB tend to 
interpret their authorizing statutes, whether consciously or not, with a goal 
of ―giv[ing] energy and effectiveness to the legislative programs for which 
they are responsible.‖72  By contrast, the Supreme Court must interpret 
these same statutory provisions in the context of a larger legal landscape, 
including the need to accommodate new and possibly impinging statutory 
provisions or constitutional law developments.73 
Of course, workplace agencies are not monolithic when construing 
provisions of their authorizing statute.  Agency interpretations support 
employer legal positions a certain amount of the time even if they more 
often construe the statute as favoring employees.  This pattern invites an 
examination of whether the Court‘s deference to the three key agencies is 
higher when agency interpretation favors employers as opposed to 
employees.  Table 3 reports results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 70. See James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 
74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1574 n.43 (1996) (reporting that Board determinations of employer 
liability under § 8(a) of the NLRA were upheld by the Supreme Court in twenty-one of 
thirty-six cases between 1970 and 1994).  Since 1994, six additional Board determinations of 
§ 8(a) employer liability have been reviewed by the Supreme Court:  three affirmed and 
three reversed.  Thus the Court has affirmed twenty-four of forty-two Board pro-employee 
determinations (57 percent) under the core NLRA provision since the start of the Burger era. 
 71. See id. at 1574 n.43 (reporting that Board determinations of employer liability under 
§ 8(a) were affirmed by the Court in fifty of sixty cases between 1940 and 1969). 
 72. Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A 
Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889, 
891 (2007). 
 73. See generally James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory:  Collective Bargaining 
Protections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 1023–30 (1996).  For a 
more recent example of this accommodation process, see Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. 
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 146–52 (2002) (limiting NLRB remedies in light of subsequently 
enacted immigrations laws).  For additional discussion, see infra Part III. 
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Table 3:  Supreme Court Win Rates  
for Pro-Employee Versus Pro-Employer Agency Determinations 
 
 
Pre-Chevron Agency Ruling Post-Chevron Agency Ruling 
For Employee For Employer For Employee For Employer 
EEOC 50%  (6/12)   0%   (0/2) 48%  (10/21) 67%  (4/6) 
NLRB 71%  (20/28) 82%   (9/11) 56%  (10/18) 67%  (2/3) 
DOL 80%  (4/5) 100% (1/1) 57%  (8/14) 75%  (12/16) 
Overall 67%  (30/45) 71%   (10/14) 53%  (28/53) 72%  (18/25) 
 
Although the number of observations is quite small in several agency 
categories, the overall direction is fairly clear.  Considering the three 
agencies together over the fifteen Terms before Chevron, the Court is 
similarly inclined to affirm agency rulings favoring employees and rulings 
supporting employers.  By contrast, the Court evidences a distinctly greater 
inclination toward deference for pro-employer agency rulings in the post-
Chevron era.  For the entire period of forty-four Terms, the Court is 
somewhat more likely to affirm pro-employer agency determinations than 
pro-employee ones.74 
The Court‘s increasingly conservative ideological orientation starting in 
1969 helps to explain its growing preference for pro-employer agency 
determinations.  But it is worth noting the Court‘s essentially identical 
affirmance rate for pro-employer and pro-employee agency outcomes 
during the pre-Chevron era, a period when federal agencies were uniformly 
part of Republican administrations.  Further, agency rulings that have 
reached the Court since Chevron—during a bipartisan presidential period—
are more conservative (pro-employer) than in the pre-Chevron years,75 and 
the agencies‘ pro-employer shift between the two periods is comparable to 
the Court‘s movement in the same direction.76  These findings suggest that 
 
 74. Between 1969 and 2013 the Court affirmed fifty-eight of ninety-eight pro-employee 
agency rulings (59 percent) and twenty-eight of thirty-nine pro-employer agency rulings (72 
percent). 
 75. The three primary workplace agencies together favored employers in fifteen of fifty-
nine pre-Chevron cases (25 percent) and twenty-six of seventy-eight post-Chevron cases 
(33 percent). 
 76. The Court‘s pro-employer results in cases implicating agency deference rose from 
twenty-four of fifty-nine pre-Chevron cases (41 percent) to forty-three of seventy-eight post-
Chevron cases (55 percent).  This pro-employer direction is based on cases in which the 
Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to grant certiorari and issue decisions.  The 
Court‘s trend does not necessarily indicate whether these three agencies have become more 
pro-employer in the overall volume of their rulings. 
2014] CHEVRON AND SKIDMORE IN THE WORKPLACE 513 
factors besides ideological orientation are contributing to the Court‘s pro-
employer tilt during the Chevron era. 
II.   THE COURT‘S RELUCTANCE TO DEFER:  TWO DOCTRINAL EXAMPLES 
The empirical results presented in Part I indicate that in the workplace 
law area, Chevron has not led the Court to accord agency deference more 
weight; or to defer more often to agencies deserving of Chevron rather than 
Skidmore deference; or to defer to agencies on a more ideologically neutral 
basis.  Assuming, therefore, that Chevron has not ushered in a new era of 
robust deference at the Supreme Court level, how should one approach the 
Court‘s deference decisions in doctrinal terms? 
Given constraints of space, this part does not attempt a comprehensive 
response.  Instead, it reviews two decisions in which the Court declined to 
defer—once to the NLRB and once to the EEOC.  The two decisions are 
linked in that they each address agency interpretations of the word 
―supervisor‖ under their respective authorizing statutes.  The NLRB 
interpretation of a statutory definition was developed in an effort to identify 
the scope of protected coverage for employees under the NLRA.  The 
EEOC interpretation of a term derived from statutory text was formulated to 
establish the scope of liability for employers under Title VII.  The Court 
had the opportunity to invoke Chevron deference under the NLRA and 
Skidmore deference under Title VII but declined to do so in each instance.  
While no pair of decisions can adequately illustrate the trends identified in 
Part I, these two cases reflect certain key aspects of the Court‘s direction, 
and they invite further inquiry on a larger scale. 
A.   Invoking Plain Language to Reject Chevron-Type Deference 
In Health Care, the Court had to decide how broadly to construe the 
NLRA‘s exemption for supervisors.  The Board had determined that four 
licensed practical nurses at a nursing home, who were responsible for 
monitoring and directing the work of aides on evenings and weekends, were 
focused ―on the well-being of the residents rather than of the employer.‖77  
The agency went on to hold that these four nurses were covered employees, 
not excluded ―supervisors,‖ based on its settled interpretation of that 
statutory term.78 
The Act‘s definition of ―supervisor‖ encompasses individuals who have 
authority, ―in the interest of the employer,‖ to hire, discipline, discharge, or 
―responsibly to direct‖ other employees.79  The Board had long construed 
this definition, and its key quoted components, to cover the interest of the 
employer in terms of personnel relations but not professional performance.  
Thus, nurses were deemed to be supervisors if, ―in addition to performing 
their professional duties and responsibilities, they also possessed the 
 
 77. See NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 574–75 (1994). 
 78. Id. at 574. 
 79. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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authority to make effective recommendations which affected the job status 
and pay of‖ health care employees working with them.80  But nurses‘ 
direction of other, less-skilled employees regarding the work to be done for 
patients was ―solely a product of their highly developed professional skills 
and do[es] not, without more, constitute an exercise of supervisory 
authority in the interest of their Employer.‖81 
The Board‘s approach relied heavily on the fact that the 1947 Congress, 
while adding an exclusion from coverage for supervisors, had 
simultaneously added protection for a class of employees called 
―professionals.‖82  Professional employees routinely give direction to other 
less-skilled workers whose performance is required if the professional is to 
carry out her assignments.83  Were professionals to be acting ―in the interest 
of the employer‖ simply because they have authority to tell other employees 
what tasks to perform, this respondeat superior–type approach would 
effectively eliminate the vast majority of professionals from the Act‘s 
coverage. 
Apart from relying on the text and structure of the 1947 amendments, the 
Board invoked more recent 1974 legislative history accompanying an 
extension of the NLRA to cover additional health care establishments.  The 
1974 House and Senate committee reports emphasized the narrow meaning 
of ―supervisor‖ in relation to health care professionals.  The reports 
specifically observed that the committees had declined requests to amend 
the definition of ―supervisor‖ to exclude various health care professionals 
because of the Board‘s established adjudicatory position.  Both reports 
emphasized that 
the Board has carefully avoided applying the definition of ―supervisor‖ to 
a health care professional who gives direction to other employees in the 
exercise of professional judgment, which direction is incidental to the 
professional‘s treatment of patients, and thus is not the exercise of 
supervisory authority in the interest of the employer.84 
The reports concluded that the Board should continue to follow this 
interpretive approach.85  The Supreme Court in an earlier case, NLRB v. 
Yeshiva University,86 had relied on this same 1974 legislative history, 
 
 80. Doctors‘ Hosp. of Modesto, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 950, 951−52 (1970), enforced, 489 
F.2d. 772 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 81. Id. at 951. 
 82. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (defining ―professional employee‖). 
 83. See NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 84. S. REP. NO. 93-766, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3946, 3951; H.R. 
REP. NO. 93-1051, at 7 (1974). 
 85. S. REP. NO. 93-766, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3946, 3951; H.R. 
REP. NO. 93-1051, at 7 (1974).  The phrase ―responsibly to direct,‖ was added as an 
amendment to the definition of ―supervisor‖ on the Senate floor during the 1947 debates.  
The floor exchange also makes clear that its author intended the phrase to cover responsible 
direction reflecting managerial authority, as distinct from minor supervision stemming from 
an employee‘s greater skill or experience. See 93 CONG. REC. 4677−78 (1947) (statement of 
Sen. Flanders). 
 86. 444 U.S. 672 (1980). 
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invoking Congress‘s ―express approv[al]‖ of the Board test that 
distinguished between supervisors and health care professionals.87 
To be sure, plausible arguments are available to counter the Board‘s 
interpretation.  The phrase ―in the interest of the employer‖ can be 
construed to apply to an employee‘s responsible direction of others beyond 
the exercise of hiring, firing, or disciplinary authority.  And the Court‘s 
Yeshiva decision, which dealt with the status of tenured faculty under the 
NLRA, also includes discussion that minimizes the professional-supervisor 
tension by equating the professional interests of university faculty with the 
university‘s governance interests as an employer.88 
The existence of reasonable arguments on each side should in principle 
lead to a Chevron Step Two analysis.  Whatever the merits of the 
competing analyses summarized above, it is a considerable stretch to 
contend that the terms ―responsibly to direct‖ and ―in the interest of the 
employer‖ as applied to health care professionals reflect ―the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,‖ or reveal that ―Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.‖89  It is far more reasonable 
to conclude that ―the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to th[is] 
specific issue,‖ in which case the agency‘s construction should be deferred 
to if rational and ―based on a permissible construction of the statute.‖90 
The Court, however, held that the Board‘s well-settled interpretation of 
the definition of ―supervisor‖ was at odds with the plain language of the 
Act.91  Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Kennedy never 
mentioned Chevron, but his Step One–type analysis concluded that the 
ordinary meaning of the phrase ―in the interest of the employer‖ 
encompassed all acts by an employee ―within the scope of employment or 
on the authorized business of the employer.‖92  Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged that this reading, broadly excluding supervisors, created 
tension with the Act‘s inclusion of professionals as employees, but he 
dismissed the Board‘s effort to resolve that tension as a distortion of the 
plain statutory language.93 
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, adopted a Step Two–type approach, also 
without adverting to Chevron deference.  She observed that Congress had 
effectively delegated to the Board in the first instance the task of separating 
excluded ―supervisors‖ from included ―professionals.‖94  She further noted 
that the Board‘s approach to this interpretive issue focused on the purposes 
of the NLRA exception for supervisors, as explained in detail in the 1947 
 
 87. Id. at 690 n.30. 
 88. Id. at 688. 
 89. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
 90. Id. at 843. 
 91. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 578–79 (1994). 
 92. Id. at 578. 
 93. Id. at 581.  The majority also discounted any reliance on the legislative history, 
characterizing the committee report language invoked by the Board as isolated and without 
authority. Id. at 581−82. 
 94. See id. at 585 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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legislative history.95  Finally, she explained how the Board‘s approach 
harmonizing Congress‘s twin policies—including professionals while 
excluding supervisors—was manifested in a series of decisions covering a 
wide array of white-collar employees besides health care professionals.96  
Taking these factors into account, Justice Ginsburg concluded that it was 
difficult to regard the agency‘s interpretation applied to diverse professional 
groups over many years as anything less than rational and consistent with 
the Act.97  As predicted by the dissent, one result of the Court‘s decision 
has been the exclusion of large numbers of professionals from the Act‘s 
protections.98 
B.   Invoking Plain Language to Reject Skidmore-Type Deference 
In Vance, the Court addressed the issue of vicarious employer liability 
for workplace harassment by a supervisor.99  The question of who qualifies 
as a ―supervisor‖ for purposes of the vicarious liability rule involved an 
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent as well as statutory text.  Title 
VII does not define or use the term ―supervisor‖; it also does not expressly 
refer to liability for hostile environment sexual harassment.  But the EEOC 
in its 1980 Guidelines had determined that harassment leading to non-
economic injury may qualify as unlawful discrimination under Title VII.100 
In 1986, the Supreme Court endorsed this determination in Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson.101  The Meritor Court also endorsed the EEOC 
position that Congress, having defined ―employer‖ to include ―any agent of 
an employer,‖ expected courts to look to agency principles for guidance on 
when employers may be held liable for such harassment.102  The majority 
 
 95. See id. at 587–88. 
 96. Id. at 590–92 (referring to pharmacists, librarians, social workers, architects, and 
engineers). 
 97. Id. at 599.  Ginsburg went on to insist that the agency‘s interpretation was required 
by the Act, implying that the Board position could be upheld under Chevron Step One as 
well as Step Two. Id. at 598–99. 
 98. On September 29, 2006, the NLRB issued a trilogy of decisions that sought to refine 
the Court‘s analysis in determining supervisory status under the NLRA.  The decisions—In 
re Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006), In re Croft Metals, Inc., 348 
N.L.R.B. 717 (2006), and In re Beverly Enters.-Minn., Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 727 (2006)—
excluded many of the challenged individuals from exercising their union rights.  In one study 
anticipating the potential effects of these cases, employee rights advocates determined that, 
depending on the NLRB‘s application of its reasoning, the cases ―[c]ould strip 8 million 
more workers of their right to participate in a union and bargain collectively, adding to the 
approximately 8.6 million first-line supervisors that the GAO estimates have already been 
excluded by prior interpretations of the NLRA.‖ ROSS EISENBREY & LAWRENCE MISHEL, 
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, SUPERVISOR IN NAME ONLY:  UNION RIGHTS OF EIGHT MILLION 
WORKERS AT STAKE IN LABOR BOARD RULING (2006), available at 
http://www.epi.org/publication/ib225/.  This fear was similar to that expressed by the dissent 
in Oakwood Healthcare, which stated that the majority‘s decision could ―create a new class 
of workers under Federal labor law:  workers who have neither the genuine prerogatives of 
management, nor the statutory rights of ordinary employees.‖  348 N.L.R.B. at 700. 
 99. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
 100. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2013). 
 101. 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
 102. See id. at 72. 
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relied on Skidmore deference with respect to both of these conclusions, 
observing that the EEOC Guidelines constituted an appropriate ―body of 
experience and informed judgment.‖103  Twelve years later, the Court in 
two separate decisions applied traditional agency law principles to hold that 
an employer may be liable for hostile environment discrimination caused by 
a supervisor.104  Neither decision, however, directly addressed the degree of 
authority over the victim that a fellow employee must possess in order to be 
classified as a supervisor.105 
Following the Court‘s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher, two separate 
views emerged regarding the meaning of a ―supervisor‖ for purposes of 
imputing liability for hostile environment harassment.  One view followed 
the reasoning set forth in an EEOC Guidance issued in June 1999, twelve 
months after the Supreme Court decisions.106  The EEOC concluded that 
federal employment discrimination statutes do not define ―supervisor,‖ and 
principles of agency law—applicable through the statutory definition of 
―employer‖107—cannot mechanically determine whether an individual has 
sufficient authority to qualify as a supervisor for purposes of vicarious 
liability.108  The Commission considered both the purposes of Title VII and 
related antidiscrimination statutes, and the reasoning of the Court‘s 
harassment decisions, to conclude that a supervisor included not only an 
individual with authority to take tangible personnel actions but also 
someone with authority to direct an employee‘s daily work activities.109  
The EEOC Guidance took close account of the Court‘s analyses in Ellerth 
and Faragher; the agency then adhered to the Guidance position 
consistently for fourteen years, and its position or analysis was followed by 
a number of lower courts.110 
A second view as to the meaning of ―supervisor,‖ also endorsed by a 
number of lower courts, limited supervisors to those authorized to take 
tangible personnel actions.  These courts too invoked the analyses from 
Ellerth and Faragher, although they did not discuss their reasons for 
departing from the EEOC Guidance or even refer to the Guidance at all in 
connection with their analyses.111 
 
 103. Id. at 65. 
 104. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 105. The issue was not directly presented in the Ellerth and Faragher cases. See Vance v. 
Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2447 (2013); id. at 2457 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 106. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:  VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL 
HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, available at 1999 WL 33305874 (June 18, 1999). 
 107. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 108. EEOC, supra note 106. 
 109. Id. at *3–4. 
 110. See, e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 2003) (expressly 
relying on the Guidance); Whitten v. Fred‘s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 245–47 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(relying on same analysis as set forth in the Guidance); Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, 
133 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1266 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (same). 
 111. See Noviello v. City of Bos., 398 F.3d 76, 96 (1st Cir. 2005); Weyers v. Lear 
Operations Corp., 359 F.3d 1049, 1057 (8th Cir. 2004).  The Noviello court invoked 
Skidmore deference for a separate issue, relying on an EEOC Compliance Manual 
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The Supreme Court held that the EEOC‘s well-settled definitional 
approach to the term ―supervisor‖ was at odds with the framework created 
under Ellerth and Faragher.112  Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice 
Alito insisted there was ―no hint in either [decision]‖ that the Court had 
contemplated any meaning beyond authority to take tangible employment 
actions.113  He quoted from Ellerth‘s statement distinguishing coworkers 
from supervisors because they were capable of inflicting psychological 
harm but not of docking someone‘s pay or demoting a fellow employee.114  
At the same time, Justice Alito declined to credit the Court‘s discussion in 
Faragher referring to a coworker with authority to control subordinates‘ 
daily work assignments as a supervisor.115  He went on to reject the EEOC 
approach as too ambiguous to establish a meaningful limitation on 
employer liability, ―[one of] the objectives of Title VII,‖116 and as 
presuming a ―highly hierarchical management structure‖ that was ―out of 
touch with the realities of the [modern] workplace.‖117 
Agency deference is hardly the equivalent of a blank check, and the 
EEOC Guidance at issue in Vance had interpreted prior Supreme Court 
decisions (a realm in which the Court has superior authority), as well as a 
gap in the statutory text.  Nonetheless, from the lengthy majority and 
dissenting opinions (and also the sharp division in the circuits), it is 
apparent that each side relies heavily on its reading of Ellerth and 
Faragher, and on its understanding of the purpose of Title VII.  The dissent 
additionally invokes the interpretive resource of agency deference. 
In this regard, it is worth noting that notwithstanding Justice Alito‘s 
concerns about its ambiguity, the EEOC Guidance recognizes a number of 
specific limits on the scope of supervisory authority while directing daily 
activities.118  In addition, the Guidance has governed the agency‘s 
enforcement judgments consistently since 1999, including in numerous 
 
interpretation but the court was silent with respect to the EEOC Guidance on vicarious 
supervisory liability. 398 F.3d at 90.  The Weyers court also did not address the EEOC 
Guidance. 
 112. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443–48 (2013). 
 113. Id. at 2448. 
 114. Id. (quoting Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998)). 
 115. See id. at 2458 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998)).  Justice Alito concluded that because the employer in Faragher 
had never disputed the supervisory status of its employee who had no hiring or disciplinary 
authority but rather ―was ‗responsible for making the lifeguards‘ daily assignments, and for 
supervising their work and fitness training,‘‖ this status had not been a relevant consideration 
in the Court‘s earlier decision. Id. at 2446–47 (majority opinion) (quoting Faragher, 524 
U.S. at 780). 
 116. Id. at 2449. 
 117. Id. at 2452.  This out of touch, hierarchical structure, of course, was precisely what 
the Court had embraced in Health Care as the unambiguous meaning of ―responsibly to 
direct . . . in the interest of the employer‖ under the NLRA. See supra notes 92–93 and 
accompanying text. 
 118. See EEOC, supra note 106, at *4 (discussing limits based on job function rather than 
job title, taking account of temporary authorizations, direction of a limited number of tasks, 
and the role of relaying other officials‘ instructions regarding work assignments). 
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briefs filed in the appellate courts,119 and the Court has often recognized the 
relevance of long-term consistency in the Skidmore setting.120  Finally, in 
relation to the asserted clarity of the Ellerth and Faragher treatment of 
supervisor, several Supreme Court decisions between 1998 and 2013 
recognized the meaning of ―supervisor‖ under Title VII as extending to 
employees who direct duties, not simply those with authority to take 
tangible employment actions.121 
The juxtaposition of the Court‘s analyses in Vance and Health Care is 
more than a little ironic, even though they deal with two separate statutes.  
The Court in Health Care insisted that the key terms defining ―supervisor‖ 
had to be given broad scope to reflect ordinary meaning.  What was 
―ordinary‖ for purposes of excluding employees from NLRA protection 
encompassed directing someone else‘s daily work activities, not merely 
having authority over their tangible employment status.  The Court rejected 
the NLRB‘s longstanding contrary view as incompatible with this ordinary 
meaning.  And yet, the Court concluded that the approach it adopted in 
Health Care, which was separately developed and applied by the EEOC, 
was unacceptably ambiguous and out of touch with workplace realities in a 
Title VII setting.  When the issue was whether an individual was a 
―supervisor‖ for purposes of including greater protection for employees 
who suffered from his conduct, the Court insisted that this individual must 
have authority over tangible employment status, not simply direct and 
supervise the daily activities of a fellow employee. 
Inconsistent results would perhaps be understandable if in each instance 
the Court had deferred to an agency determination.  That there may be two 
reasonable interpretations of the term ―supervisor‖ under each statutory 
scheme would enable the Court to justify supporting the agency position on 
each occasion.  It seems harder to explain inconsistent results based on a 
rejection of agency judgments, particularly judgments rendered consistently 
over a long period of time in highly visible and elaborated contexts.  One 
possible explanation is the Court‘s growing inclination to favor employers 
on these matters.  Another involves the Court‘s burgeoning confidence that 
it can identify and explain contested statutory terms or concepts as clear and 
unambiguous, rather than obscure or inconclusive. 
 
 119. See Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 28, 
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (No. 11-556), 2012 WL 3864279 (citing to 
six briefs filed by EEOC). 
 120. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335 
(2011); Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008); Nashville Gas Co. v. 
Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 n.4 (1977). 
 121. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 70–71 (2006) 
(recognizing that retaliatory reallocation of job duties within the same position was 
actionable); Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 140 (2004) (evaluating constructive 
discharge claim by supervisors responsible for daily work assignments); Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998) (recognizing supervisory authority 
by two employees who had de facto control over plaintiff‘s conditions of employment); see 
also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190–91, 1193 (2011) (applying Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act). 
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III.   WHY CHEVRON DEFERENCE MATTERS SO LITTLE IN THE WORKPLACE 
The empirical results and doctrinal analyses presented above are not 
necessarily unique to the workplace law field.  At the same time, these 
results and analyses call for explanations, which, while specific to 
workplace law, may shed light on the complex fate of Chevron deference in 
larger terms. 
A.   Ideology 
As noted at the end of Part II, one explanation invokes ideological 
factors.  From the mid-1930s through the early 1990s, liberal coalitions in 
both houses of Congress enacted more than a dozen major employee 
protection statutes.122  Many of these laws, regulating and restricting 
employers‘ business discretion in the areas of labor-management relations, 
civil rights, and labor standards, were endorsed by Republican as well as 
Democratic presidents.123  The three major agencies responsible for 
implementation of these statutes have adopted a fairly vigorous pro-
employee approach (with occasional pauses or exceptions) through 
rulemaking, adjudication, and less formal interpretive and guidance efforts. 
On the other hand, the Court has grown steadily more conservative since 
1970.  In terms of its composition, Justices appointed to the Rehnquist 
Court were more conservative than their Burger Court predecessors, and 
Justices in the Roberts era tend to be more conservative than those from the 
Rehnquist era.124  The increasingly conservative orientation is especially 
visible in an ideologically charged field like workplace law, as illustrated in 
voting scores compiled by Supreme Court scholar Harold Spaeth.125  Given 
the direction of this ideological orientation, it is not surprising that the 
Court has become less willing to endorse or defer to pro-employee agency 
 
 122. In addition to the NLRA, the three major civil rights statutes administered by the 
EEOC, see supra note 32, and the seven labor standards statutes administered by the DOL, 
see supra note 33, Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act, the Employee Polygraph Protection 
Act, and numerous expansions or modifications of many of these statutes. 
 123. For example, President Nixon signed the Occupational Safety and Health Act and 
the Mine Safety and Health Act; President Reagan signed the Employee Polygraph 
Protection Act; and President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA, the Older Workers 
Benefit Protection Act, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 
 124. See Martin, Quinn & Epstein, supra note 65, at 1300–04 (describing the increasing 
conservatism of the Justices from the Warren to the Rehnquist Court as measured by the 
partisan orientation of the median Justice); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court 
at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, 955–81 (2008) (describing increasing conservatism in 
early years of the Roberts Court); RONALD DWORKIN, THE SUPREME COURT PHALANX:  THE 
COURT‘S NEW RIGHT-WING BLOC 47 (2008); Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, 
Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at A1. 
 125. I previously obtained an ideology score exogenous to my dataset using each Justice‘s 
votes on a subgroup of civil rights, union-related, government employee, and economic 
issues in the Spaeth database.  For results covering Justices on the Court from the 1969 to 
1970 through the 2005 to 2006 terms, see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal 
Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History:  Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 130–31 nn.44–46 (2008).  These results do not include any 
votes from Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, appointed after June 2006. 
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interpretations arising from the circuit-conflict settings where these 
interpretations have been contested. 
In addition, there is an institutional dimension to the ideology factor.  
Workplace agencies are for the most part on a mission to promote collective 
bargaining and to protect employee rights, as one would expect in their role 
as implementers of the specific statutory directives that created them and 
give them their powers.  By contrast, the Supreme Court as well as lower 
federal courts must integrate these statutory directives with developments in 
the larger legal landscape.  The NLRA is perhaps the paradigmatic example 
of a statute unchanged for decades even as the political, economic, and legal 
conditions that existed in the 1930s and 1940s no longer obtain.  The statute 
emphasizes the central value of establishing and maintaining stable 
collective bargaining relationships, including addressing the free rider 
problem through mechanisms to create union financial stability.  But the 
economic culture many decades later prefers free enterprise efficiency and 
innovation over collective bargaining stability.  And the legal culture has 
become distinctly more individual rights oriented—both in how it promotes 
a fairer distribution of economic resources126 and how it recognizes an 
individual right to refrain from union membership or representation.127 
In this setting, the Court may be reflecting as well as advancing an 
altered set of legal norms when it refuses to defer to NLRB rulings 
anchored in considerations of bargaining stability and related union 
capacity.128  In similar, although perhaps less dramatic terms, the Court‘s 
reluctance to defer to EEOC interpretations of Title VII and the ADEA may 
reflect in part the Court‘s perspective that robust enforcement of statutory 
antidiscrimination norms must be reconciled with respect for business 
interests in efficiency and competitiveness.  The perceived need for 
accommodation arguably plays out when the Court construes statutory 
language to insulate employers from attack on their putatively neutral or 
settled practices related to compensation, fringe benefits, and noneconomic 
aspects of the employment relationship.129 
 
 126. See generally Brudney, supra note 70, at 1568–72 (discussing Congress‘s enactment 
of an array of new laws promoting and protecting individual employee rights while forsaking 
renewed commitments to group action as a means of regulating the workplace). 
 127. See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union 
Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012); Chi. Teachers Union Local 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 
(1986); Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit 
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 128. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998) (rejecting 
considerations of bargaining stability); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) 
(dismissing arguments in support of union access to employer workplaces); Commc‘ns 
Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (declining to recognize claims for union 
financial security). 
 129. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (upholding 
employer position on compensation); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 
(1989) (sustaining employer position on fringe benefits); see also Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. 
Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (upholding employer position regarding other 
employment conditions); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (same). 
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B.   Methodology 
The Court may invoke agency deference selectively or strategically, just 
as it does for certain other interpretive assets.  Dictionaries and canons may 
be more obvious targets for a cherrypicking critique, given that in the 
Court‘s hands their use seems unaccompanied by basic objective 
standards.130  But as Peter Strauss recently noted, ―deference‖ itself is a 
highly variable concept, ranging from ―obey/accept‖ to ―respectfully 
consider.‖131  When examining agency deference as a source of relevant 
evidence, Skidmore virtues such as subject matter expertise, grasp of 
legislative intent, and consistent application may each be respectfully 
considered without being obeyed or accepted.  And in Chevron terms, the 
special deference associated with political accountability may be overcome 
by rigorous Step One textual analysis. 
As Table 1 makes clear, the Court has turned increasingly to textually 
related analyses to justify its outcomes in workplace statutory cases.  A 
heavier reliance on dictionaries, language canons, and ordinary meaning 
(and a diminished use of legislative history and purpose) results in more 
decisions being based on assertedly unambiguous statutory text.132  In the 
workplace law dataset, the Court‘s express refusal to defer under Chevron 
invariably involves a Step One analysis.133  This Step One approach to 
rejecting deference has been recognized with respect to agencies outside the 
workplace law setting,134 and it is a natural corollary of the Court‘s 
textualist turn. Because the turn to intensely language-based analysis has 
 
 130. On dictionaries, see James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage:  The 
Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 483 (2013); Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word:  Dictionary Shopping in the 
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998); Note, Looking It Up:  Dictionaries and 
Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994).  On canons, see Brudney & 
Ditslear, supra note 24; Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085 
(1995); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone Karl Llewellyn?  Should Congress Turn Its 
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1992). 
 131. Peter L. Strauss, ―Deference‖ Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them ―Chevron Space‖ 
and ―Skidmore Weight,‖ 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012). 
 132. For workplace law examples beyond this Article‘s agency deference focus, see 
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 (2009); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 
532 U.S. 105 (2001); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997); Mertens v. Hewitt 
Associates, 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
 133. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004); Barnhart v. 
Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002); Lechmere, 502 U.S. 527; Dole v. United 
Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990); Pittston Coal Grp. v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 
(1988). 
 134. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the Millennium:  A Delegation 
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1399–1400 (2000) (noting that 
until 1999—AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999)—the Court had never 
invalidated an agency interpretation under Chevron Step Two).  There is even disagreement 
as to whether this 1999 case was an invalidation under Step Two. See Donald S. Dobkin, The 
Rise of the Administrative State:  A Prescription for Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 
362, 373–74 (2008) (―To date, an agency‘s decision has not been invalidated by the Supreme 
Court under step two of Chevron (though several Courts of Appeal have done so).‖ (citing 
STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 289–90 (5th ed. 
2002))). 
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been driven primarily though not exclusively by conservative Justices, the 
link between Step One deference rejection and pro-employer results is 
understandable if not predictable. 
Moreover, the Court‘s now-prevailing appetite for close textual analysis 
may have the effect of diminishing the distance between its two principal 
agency deference standards.  When considering the contours of an 
increasingly popular Step One Chevron review, some scholars suggest that 
the Court should give Skidmore deference to an agency‘s reading of the 
statute.135  Agencies often have helped to draft the statutory language, and 
their expert insights about original meaning seem relevant to a judicial 
determination as to whether ―Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.‖136  A consistent and longstanding agency interpretation, 
on which parties have relied and which the legislature has left undisturbed, 
also may be probative in assessing whether Congress has unambiguously 
addressed a contested statutory issue.137 
Perhaps for these reasons, the Court in an early post-Chevron decision 
incorporated Skidmore factors into its Step One analysis,138 and the Justices 
on occasion have done so in the workplace law setting.139  Conversely, the 
Court‘s Skidmore-based refusals to defer often include reliance on the 
conclusion that the agency‘s interpretation is inconsistent with or lacks 
support from the plain language of the statute.140  And as the Court has 
further observed, there is no reason to choose between Chevron and 
Skidmore standards when it determines that an agency is either clearly right 
or clearly wrong as a matter of law.141  Thus, inasmuch as the Court‘s focus 
has shifted toward more extensive review of enacted text142 in an 
 
 135. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain:  A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret 
Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 449 (2013); Strauss, supra note 131, at 1146. 
 136. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 137. Eskridge, supra note 135, at 449. 
 138. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (giving agency 
interpretation diminished weight for inconsistency during Step One rejection of its position). 
 139. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (referring to 
both Chevron and Skidmore as applicable to show agency is wrong as matter of law); Dole v. 
United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 34–40 (1990) (finding agency interpretation 
incorrect as a matter of law based on the purpose of the Act as a whole as well as certain 
language and structure, and because no exact statutory provision supports agency); see also 
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 470–71 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
that consistent agency interpretation across different administrations is relevant for Chevron 
purposes). 
 140. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (rejecting EEOC 
Guidelines as inconsistent with letter as well as spirit of ADA); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil 
Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (rejecting EEOC interpretation as lacking support in plain 
language of statute, as well as not being contemporaneous or consistent with prior 
interpretations); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) (rejecting EEOC 
Guidelines as inconsistent with plain meaning of statute). 
 141. See Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 600 (agency clearly wrong); Edelman v. Lynchburg 
Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002) (agency clearly right). 
 142. The turn to textualism does not mean that reliance on legislative history or purpose 
has disappeared.  These resources remain relevant both to Chevron Step One analysis and 
when considering Skidmore expertise. 
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increasingly successful hunt for unambiguous meaning, this focus may 
result in differences between deference standards becoming of lesser 
importance to its review process. 
C.   Institutional Relations 
Finally, the counterintuitive patterns of lesser deference for the NLRB 
under Chevron than for the EEOC under Skidmore may be in part 
attributable to the contrast between the Board‘s prolonged isolation from 
Congress and the EEOC‘s continuing integration with the legislative 
branch.  Following longstanding legislative gridlock, engineered by labor 
and management as powerful interest groups, Congress has failed to update 
the NLRA since 1959.  This remarkable period of congressional inaction 
has left the NLRB on a political island, lacking the full accountability status 
envisioned under Chevron.143  Of particular relevance, because all efforts to 
amend the NLRA in either labor or management directions have failed to 
garner necessary supermajority support,144 the accountability inherent in a 
congressional override for failure to defer is entirely absent.  The Court has 
little to fear by yielding to its conservative inclinations on reasonably 
contested issues, thereby limiting the NLRA‘s scope of protections for 
collective bargaining and related employee rights. 
By contrast, Congress regularly revisits and updates the mandates and 
policy directives governing EEOC operations.145  Indeed, from 1980 to 
2009, Congress often overrode conservative Court decisions in the 
employment discrimination area, primarily those interpreting Title VII but 
also decisions construing the ADEA and the ADA.146  From the standpoint 
 
 143. See generally Brudney, supra note 14. 
 144. Unsuccessful efforts at reform on the union side have foundered in the Senate, due to 
the failure to secure sixty votes to end a filibuster. See Labor Law Reform Act, S. 2467, 95th 
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Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103; Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076; Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; 
and Lily Ledbetter Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.  For examples involving Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act since 1967, see ADEA Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189; ADEA Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342; 
and the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978.  
For examples involving disability law, see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012) and the ADA Amendments of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
122 Stat. 3553. 
 146. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge Jr., Congressional Overrides of 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1356–
60 (2014) (reporting that antidiscrimination laws are a regular focus of successful 
congressional override activity, whereas labor law is virtually absent from the dataset of 
statutory overrides).  For notable examples of statutes overriding Supreme Court decisions 
that construed antidiscrimination laws, see 1976 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 1978 ADEA 
Amendments, 1990 Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 1991 Civil Rights Act, 2008 
ADA Amendments, and 2009 Lily Ledbetter Act. 
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of institutional self-protection, the Court may well feel a need to pay more 
attention to EEOC interpretations.147  This attentiveness is based not on the 
agency‘s rule of law standing as specified in one statute versus another.  
Instead, it derives from the agency‘s connection to the policy preferences of 
contemporary Congresses.  Because the EEOC‘s political accountability is 
essentially being renewed in both branches, the Court is more likely to be 
punished for failing to defer. 
That is not to say the Court is unwilling to reject EEOC positions for 
ideological reasons, or that it will not invoke Skidmore to help explain its 
reluctance to defer in specific cases.  Since Congress enacted large-scale 
overrides of the Court‘s civil rights statutory interpretations in 1990 and 
1991, the Court has declined to defer to the agency in eight of thirteen 
cases, and its rulings favored employers in six of those eight decisions.148  
Still, Congress has overridden several post-1991 Court decisions favoring 
employers; two others are so recent it may be too early to know whether 
Congress will react to them.149  In the end, the fact that the EEOC has 
received a higher level of deference since 1984 than it did in the prior 
fifteen years, notwithstanding the arrival of an ever-more conservative 
Court, suggests that there may be some residual respect for the combined 
weight of the politically accountable branches. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown that Chevron‘s role as a deference-triggering 
norm has not come close to fulfilling initial expectations in the workplace 
law field.  Over three decades, the Court has often relied on pro-employer 
ideological preferences and a passion for rigorous textual analysis to 
undermine its embrace of the putatively game-changing Chevron standard.  
Support for NLRB determinations has declined noticeably since Chevron, 
even though the Court remains formally committed to broader deference.  
 
 147. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (―In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master.  It obviously 
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EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (No. 89-1838) (Jan. 18, 1991) (on file with the Library of 
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O‘Connor, who voted with the majority to affirm the lower court ruling against 
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refusing to defer to the EEOC, see, for example, University of Texas Southwest Medical 
Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 
U.S. 618 (2007); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 149. Congress has overridden Ledbetter (in 2009 with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5) and Sutton (in 2008 by the ADA Amendments Act, Pub. L. 
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3552).  Vance and Nassar were decided in June 2013. 
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With respect to DOL interpretations, there is evidence that Step Zero 
analysis has influenced Chevron applicability but there are also ample 
instances of refusals to defer based on Chevron Step One review. 
Ironically, the judicial deference record under Skidmore has been 
somewhat more positive since Chevron when reviewing agency 
interpretations of federal antidiscrimination statutes.  To be clear, the 
invocation of Skidmore or Skidmore-type factors has hardly resulted in 
robust respect for agency determinations.  Further, to the extent that the 
Justices have been prepared to defer to EEOC judgments, the most 
persuasive explanation may be that Congress‘s continuing willingness to 
override anti-agency pro-employer interpretations acts as a restraint on the 
current Court‘s ideological and methodological proclivities. 
Workplace law is only one area of federal statutory development, and it 
is more ideologically polarizing than some others.  Still, the findings that 
Chevron has had limited impact are supported by other scholarly work 
covering a wider range of subject matter.150  The past need not be prologue 
with respect to the impact of the Chevron approach:  the Court‘s ideological 
composition may change, and in addition the current cycle of heavy reliance 
on textual analysis may give way to a more purposive interpretive 
orientation.151  For now, though, the levels of agency deference under both 
Chevron and Skidmore seem likely to remain quite limited, and well below 
the aspirations of Chevron enthusiasts. 
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